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Corporate Governance: A Director's View*
BRYAN F. SMITH**
The Draft Restatement prescribes the composition and ac-
tivities of boards of directors. Based on his experience as a
member of several corporate boards, the author is convinced
that these requirements would have a harmful impact on cor-
porate governance.
The Draft Restatement impedes directors' responses to the
corporation's needs by stipulating the number and role of inde-
pendent directors and mandating monitoring activities, by re-
quiring a "rational basis" for business judgments, and by re-
laxing procedural barriers to derivative suits. These formal
requirements emphasize restraint at the expense of effective
governance. The board of directors should remain free to meet
the changing demands of the modern corporation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
So much has been written on corporate governance that one
fears undue repetition. Yet, additional insight may be gained from
a look at the problems involved in creating an effective board
* The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable contributions of Richard L.
Joosten and James H. Johnson.
** General Director, Texas Instruments Incorporated (1973 through Jan. 1984); Direc-
tor, Blue Bell, Inc., Computer Language Research, Inc., Engraph, Inc., French American
Banking Corp., Mary Kay Cosmetics, Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Preston State Bank,
and RSR Corp.
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structure from the point of view of one who has served on the
boards of several very different corporations and participated in
intense debate among the academic community, the corporate
world, and the general public concerning the internal structure and
governance of the corporation.
From the boardroom, the problems of choosing the next chief
executive officer, setting up and participating in an effective com-
mittee structure, monitoring top-level management, and partici-
pating in strategic planning decisions are not abstract concepts. A
board is composed of individuals, and the process by which these
problems are resolved is a very dynamic and organic one.
Last year alone my duties as a director required attendance at
regular meetings of the board, many meetings of various commit-
tees, and innumerable small conferences on board-related matters.
Decisions were made regarding buildups and layoffs, the replace-
ment of chief executive officers (both planned and unplanned), re-
organizations, innovative financing and strategic directions. In one
instance, a compensation committee on which I served authorized
annual compensation of a million dollars per year to a corporate
officer. These matters involved the exercise of the business judg-
ment, intuition, and experience of each of the directors called upon
to consider them. During the last five years the Texas Instruments
("TI") board has authorized over $1.8 billion in capital expendi-
tures, issued debentures valued at $200 million, authorized over
$750 million for research and development, and monitored the in-
vestments of a pension fund valued at $400 million.
Today's board members must face such troublesome issues as
terrorism, crime, and the adequacy of the corporation's reserves in
an unstable international economic environment. Compliance with
both the letter and the spirit of complex laws, such as the disclos-
ure requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), is another area of constant concern. In short, when we
discuss corporate governance, we must never lose sight of the fact
that this "institution" of the corporate board is a dynamic organi-
zation, and one that imposes tremendous responsibilities and obli-
gations upon the individuals who are elected to serve.
The modern corporation can be an incredibly complex institu-
tion. Thousands of business decisions are made every day at vari-
ous levels within the management structure, which is organized
through mechanisms of delegation and review to promote efficient
use of the corporation's resources. The interface among sharehold-
ers, management, and the board of directors, and the role of each
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in the overall structure of the corporation, cannot always be read-
ily described or even identified.
Generalization tends toward oversimplification. In fact, the
very diversity of what has been described as the corporate "cul-
tures" makes it highly improbable that any one set of structural
mandates could be imposed on even a discrete segment of the cor-
porate world without a significant disruption of those cultures.'
These corporate cultures are only partly the product of the formal
structuring of the relationships among management, directors,
shareholders, employees, and others. They are often equally keyed
to the individual personalities of the chief executive officers
("CEO's"), or to the personal interaction among the CEO, manage-
ment in general, and the board. Often it is the board itself that is
in a position to protect and preserve the continuity of a successful
corporate culture during changes of upper-level management. The
balance between board and management can be quite delicate at
times, and any wholesale attempt at imposing a set of duties on
the workings of the boardroom will likely result in the disruption
and perhaps even in the destruction of that balance.
Nevertheless, the concept of formulating an ideal set of guid-
ing principles for what has become known as corporate governance
appears to be one that appeals to many and that refuses to go
away.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEBATE AND THE EMERGING CONSENSUS
I
During the past decade corporate governance has become a
topic for heated debate. The American Law Institute's Principles
of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recom-
mendations ("Draft Restatement")2 represents the latest addition
to the extensive body of commentary and analysis of corporate
structure. Departing from the traditional task of synthesizing and
codifying existing legal principles, however, the Reporters have
fashioned a document that is more statement than restatement.'
The document uses such normative phrases as "corporate law
should provide" and "as a matter of good corporate practice.'"
1. For an interesting treatment of the importance of corporate culture, see T. DEAL &
A. KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES (1982).
2. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] (available from Ameri-
can Law Institute's Executive Office, Philadelphia, Pa.).
3. Id. introductory note at xxi.
4. The following is just one example:
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In his foreward to the Draft Restatement, American Law In-
stitute (ALI) Director Herbert Wechsler characterizes the Restate-
ment as the fulfillment of the early expectations of Louis Loss,
who had stated: "The new art form that I would hope would evolve
would be a combination of classic restatement, forward looking
guidelines, and perhaps also model provisions - without having a
model code."5 To understand this "new art form" and to evaluate
its potential significance, it is helpful to explore, at least briefly,
the context of the debate of which it is a product.
A. The Corporate Accountability Debate
Although in some ways the debate surrounding the Restate-
ment echoes the corporate reform literature of the first half of this
century,' the current corporate governance debate can best be un-
derstood by reviewing the events of the last decade. The growing
importance of such public issues as pollution and the environment,
consumerism, and civil rights in the late 1960's and early 1970's led
to the enactment of hundreds of new regulatory restraints on busi-
ness enterprises. The revelations of Watergate and instances of
corporate bribery and corruption represented to many a break-
down of effective control in certain elements of American business.
The general spirit of distrust of powerful institutions that had
been developing throughout this period was now increasingly ap-
pearing as an antibusiness sentiment. Equity Funding and other
corporate disasters, such as the collapse of Penn Central, contrib-
uted to a climate of distrust and suspicion of the operation and
integrity of American business. Public perception of business, as
reflected in public opinion polls, was at an all-time low.
7
Scores of books and academic articles were published, all of
§ 3.03. Composition of the Board of Directors
(a) Corporate law should provide that at least a majority of the directors ....
(b) As a matter of good corporate practice, a publicly held corporation ....
Id. § 3.03(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
5. Id. foreward at ix (quoting Loss, Concluding Remarks, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPO-
RATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-ABA SYMPosIUMs 1977-1978, at 555 (D.
Schwartz ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES]).
6. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932); Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); Dodd,
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
7. "For example, in mid-1975 'Big Business' had a 61% negative confidence rating.
Business in general had a 48% negative rating. These negative ratings were strongest among
young educated persons." Greenough & Clapman, The Role of Independent Directors in
Corporate Governance, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 916, 917 n.7 (1981), (citing G. GALLUP, THE
GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1972-1977, at 529 (1978)).
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which had as their principal theme the failure of the board of di-
rectors, both as a legal entity and as an element of corporate gov-
ernance, to fulfill its function.' The SEC, particularly through the
activities of its then-Chairman Harold Williams, produced a steady
stream of speeches, reports and proceedings that publicized the
Commission's views regarding the diligence expected of directors of
a publicly held corporation."
Legislation, including the Corporate Democracy Act of 198010
and the Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980," was in-
troduced in Congress. Private sector groups, like the Business
Roundtable and the American Bar Association Committee on Cor-
porate Laws, responded with contributions such as the Corporate
Director's Guidebook12 and the Statement on Corporate Responsi-
bility.13 With the onset of the economic troubles of the early
1980's, the clamor for reform decreased in intensity, but beneath
the surface calm there remained an active, sometimes heated, de-
bate among those who proposed one or another reform, or no re-
form at all.
B. The Consensus
One result of this debate was the gradual emergence of a
rough consensus concerning the proper function of the board and
its role in correcting and preventing the kinds of abuses that had
been occurring. Within the traditional corporate structure concept
of assuring profit maximization, the board became "identified as
the entity within the corporation which could and should perform
8. See, e.g., COMMENTARIES, supra note 5, passim; CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS:
GOVERNANCE AND REFORM (D. DeMott ed. 1980); M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976); Ruder, Corporate Governance: An Analysis of Du-
ties, Attacks, and Responses, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 741 (1979) (sources cited therein).
9. For a concise enunciation of Harold Williams's views on the directorship, see H. WIL-
LIAMS & I. SHAPIRO, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE CORPORATE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS (1979) (The 1979 Benjamin F. Fairless Memorial Lectures).
10. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Protection of Shareholders' Rights
Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2567 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1980) (introduced by
Congressman Rosenthal of New York).
11. S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S3754 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1980) (intro-
duced by Senator Metzenbaum of Ohio).
12. Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Corpo-
rate Director's Guidebook].
13. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1981); see
also Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, The Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1837 (1979).
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a monitoring role to prevent such conduct [activities violating law]
from reoccurring and to replace management not performing up to
established goals."14 Central to this idea is the concept of an "inde-
pendent" board acting in part as the legitimizer of corporate power
in society. This role is anchored in the duty of the board to moni-
tor management decisions and to act as the conscience of the cor-
poration by considering the larger questions of the corporation's
role in society and the need for ethical and socially responsible
conduct by the corporation both in its "external" business activi-
ties and in its internal culture.
Increasingly, commentators have assigned the board a role in
the strategic planning process, tying this role to the board's obliga-
tion to consider the long-term effects and the full consequences of
corporate actions. 5 This role is also seen as rooted in the board's
independence and unique semi-autonomy within the overall corpo-
rate structure-an autonomy that gives it a fresh perspective on
the long-term strategic impact of corporate decisions.
The duty of the board to select top management is another
universally recognized function. This power, and the power to re-
place management, enables the board to oversee managerial per-
formance of the wealth-maximizing tasks, as well as to monitor for
compliance with the law.
Together with this view of the function of the board, the cor-
porate governance debate has produced a rough agreement on cer-
tain principles of corporate governance that should ensure the
proper execution of the board's functions. An essential element of
this understanding is the concept of independence. The American
Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws, the Business
Roundtable, the Metzenbaum and Rosenthal legislation proposed
several years ago, former SEC Chairman Harold Williams, and now
the ALI Reporters have all endorsed the idea of an independent
board."8 This concept is based on the belief that board members
whose judgment is unaffected by business ties or personal employ-
ment concerns can best carry out the monitoring function.
In addition to independence, all agree on the need for an in-
14. The World of the '80's-1980 Annual Meeting Program of the Section, 37 Bus.
LAW. 203, 229 (1981) (comments by Edward F. Greene concerning corporate governance).
15. See, e.g., Lear, Getting the Board into the Strategic Planning Program, DIRECTOR's
MONTHLY, Nov. 1982, at 1.
16. Ruder, Current Issues Between Corporations and Shareholders: Private Sector Re-
sponses to Proposals for Federal Intervention into Corporate Governance, 36 Bus. LAW.
771, 775-77 & nn.19-29 (1981) (discussion of independent board concept).
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crease in time spent by directors on corporate affairs. Sufficient
remuneration to reflect the increased demands of a more active
role for the board, as well as to ensure that the board can attract
and retain qualified individuals, is another necessity. This in-
creased involvement can be effectively implemented through the
use of committees, which can focus attention on limited key areas
such as corporate audits and board nominations. The committee
experience should thereby help to ensure adequate exposure and
knowledge on the part of directors.
C. Business's Response to the Challenge
The most notable aspect of the debate that has occurred dur-
ing the past decade is not that the debate has resulted in a fairly
coherent theory of the role of the board, but instead, that most
corporations have voluntarily implemented so many elements of
this theory. The empirical data assembled in the past few years by
Heidrick and Struggles, Korn/Ferry, Hay Associates, and others
are compelling. 17 There has been a marked increase in the number
of corporations preferring that a majority of directors be "indepen-
dent" of management. 18 There are also more boards with audit,
compensation, nominating, and public policy committees com-
posed of a majority of such "independent" directors. 9 One study
of the rapidly evolving corporate governance structure of American
corporations calls this rise in the importance of committees "the
most significant change in board structure."20 The time spent by
17. While definitional differences make exact comparisons between data generated by
different sources difficult, the trends shown by the various studies are identical. A 1981
Korn/Ferry report indicated that an average of nine out of thirteen board members, or
about 70%, were "outside" directors. KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
EIGHTH ANNUAL STUDY 3 (1981). An August 1980 survey of large industrial companies indi-
cated that outside directors constituted a majority of boards of directors at 88% of the
responding firms. Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1980, at 33, col. 3. The 1983 Heidrick and Struggles
study of the Fortune 1350 companies, which used a narrow definition of "independence,"
showed that 59% of all directors were "independent" in 1982, as compared with 54% in
1980. The study revealed also an increased use of committees of the board. Audit commit-
tees were found in nearly 100% of all companies, compensation committees in 98%, nomi-
nating committees in 79%, finance committees in 65%, and corporate responsibility com-
mittees in 36%. The comparable percentages for 1976 were 93%, 85%, 9%, 33%, and 5%,
respectively. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD (1983), cited in Deloitte,
Haskins & Sells, The Week in Review, Feb. 4, 1983, at 1-2.
18. KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17, at 3, 10.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Cox, Facing Major Issues in Corporate Governance, DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY, Oct.
1982, at 1, 3 (citing ARTHUR YOUNG EXECUTIVE RESOURCE CONSULTANTS, THE NEW DIRECTOR:
CHANGING VIEWS OF THE BOARD'S ROLE (1981)).
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outside directors both at committee and board meetings and in
preparation for them has been increasing, reaching an annual aver-
age of more than fifteen days, according to a 1981 report.21
D. The Independent Director Movement
Of course, an honest assessment of board independence and
effectiveness in its new roles must look behind these statistics and
address the harder question of how an individual board works.
Thus, it may be helpful to touch on some of the possible causes of
the private sector's apparent swing away from the "rubber stamp"
and toward an independent, active board of directors.
The threat of federal intervention may have influenced some
corporations to adopt structural changes simply to keep the gov-
ernment out of corporate affairs. Harold Williams, anticipating a
movement toward federal legislative action, urged business to take
measures calculated to defuse federal intervention.22 These warn-
ings, no doubt, opened a few eyes to the need for an analysis of the
existing corporate governance structure. Yet, it would be mislead-
ing to characterize the recent broad-based evolution as a mere re-
action to a perceived threat of federal intervention.
Active and effective boards of directors certainly existed prior
to the recent corporate governance debate. Many corporations, in-
cluding Texas Instruments, have long realized that the increasing
complexity and competitiveness of the modern business world de-
mand full use of all corporate resources, including the board of di-
rectors. Critics of the corporate world studied the most effective
boards very little because their attention was naturally drawn to
newsmaking corporate abuses. The directors' constituents-the
shareholders-demonstrated a notable lack of interest in the de-
bate and on the whole appeared to be satisfied with the existing
structure. Within the corporate circle itself, some of the more sig-
nificant experiments in the use of the board came in the area of
21. KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17, at 8.
22. Williams wrote:
I oppose federal legislation or regulatory action to charter corporations, to dic-
tate board structure, or even to impose my own suggestions. My goal is to high-
light my sense of urgency that corporations, their managements and boards as-
sume that initiative in assessing the responsibilities of corporate boards and how
they might better be carried out so as to strengthen the case against legislation,
and make it unlikely - not to hasten its passage. While some apparently believe
that legislation is the key to reform, I am concerned that federal encroachment
into the board room would likely cripple rather than strengthen its functioning.
H. WILLIAMS & I. SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 21.
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strategic planning, not in the area of monitoring and oversight.
This is not to suggest, however, that the public corporate account-
ability debate itself did not contribute to the growth of the genuine
independence and vitality of corporate boards. The impact of the
dynamic, free exchange of ideas on corporate governance is undeni-
able. It is now widely accepted that the board ought to function as
a key element of corporate governance and as a protector against
the kind of corporate mismanagement that was roundly denounced
in the 1970's.23
The evolution of the corporate board revealed by the various
surveys and studies should demonstrate to those critics of the ex-
isting corporate governance structure that the business world is
open to change. Indeed, all corporations actively seek to improve
the effectiveness of their boards of directors. Nevertheless, it would
be a mistake to assume that if eighty percent of today's board-
rooms hold a majority of "independent" directors (however that
term is defined), an effort should be made to bring the remaining
twenty percent into that same position. Although independence is
valuable, committees are useful, and monitoring is a proper func-
tion of the board, the requirement that every board conform to a
particular model or set of standards presumes that there is a single
model that will produce the most effective board for all corpora-
tions. I do not believe that such a model exists.
As today's boardrooms experiment with new techniques of
governance, all of which are aimed at achieving the goal of promot-
ing a more effective role for the board, we are learning more about
the utility of the structural proposals brought forth in the debates
of the last ten years. This process of experimentation and evolu-
tion holds the real promise for progress in the area of corporate
governance.
E. The ALI Proposal and the Need for Flexibility
The theories that have emerged from the recent corporate gov-
ernance debate, although extremely useful in providing guidelines
to corporate boards, are limited by the fact that no two boards,
and no two corporations, are the same. Each board must identify
its goals, help define its function, and then set out to implement
23. "[T]hose interested in the future of our corporations must soon take or support
affirmative and constructive steps that will provide greater accountability - more effective
monitoring of decisional processes - or run the risk that possibly excessive measures may
eventually be taken by legislative bodies reacting to the societal expectations." Kroll, Intro-
duction by the Chairman, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 5, at 30, 31.
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whatever formal structures it believes necessary to meet those
goals and fulfill that function. Unless the board is motivated by an
internal commitment to achieve excellence, no amount of formal
structuring will bring about that excellence.
It is equally important to realize that the problems of corpo-
rate governance require flexibility of response on the part of the
board even when the commitment to excellence already exists. I
currently serve on the boards of two corporations engaged in two
very diverse businesses. One board has a majority of "indepen-
dent" directors, and the other is composed primarily of "insiders."
The latter functions every bit as effectively as the board having a
majority of "independent" directors.
A recent article by Kenneth Andrews 4 examined the ALI pro-
posals and concluded:
The case against formalizing into law the proposed defini-
tion of board function, formal committee structure and composi-
tion, the substantial modifications of duty of care, the business
judgment rule, and the termination conditions for derivative ac-
tions is shaped by the answers to these questions:
1 How much do the ALI authors know about how boards
actually work, what is reasonable to expect of outside directors,
how business judgments are arrived at, and how progress is
made in making management of complex corporations more ef-
fective and responsible? How responsive have they been to their
advisers from business, management, and boards of directors?
2 What is the probable effect of the proposals for new law
on the actual functioning of boards of directors, on the decision-
making process, and on the evolution in board practice now
under way?2"
These are excellent questions, and crucial ones. Although the indi-
vidual elements of the ALI proposal can be attacked and debated,
it is perhaps more important to step back from that debate and
explore the implications of the Restatement's proposed blueprint
for the law of corporate governance. The Reporters must consider
the questions Mr. Andrews has posed, and they must respond to
the answers they receive.
24. Andrews, Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good Boards, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec.
1982, at 34.
25. Id. at 36.
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III. THE TEXAS INSTRUMENTS EXPERIENCE
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the evolutionary process by
which many corporations have instituted changes in their govern-
ance structure is to present a case history. One example of an 'in-
ternally generated reform of board structure is that of Texas In-
struments. Back in 1966, Pat Haggerty, then TI's chairman,
observed that it was time "to do some real pioneering in the struc-
turing of a board of directors."26 Haggerty recognized the need, es-
pecially in volatile technology-intensive businesses, of a mechanism
at a very high level for objective deliberations on questions of basic
corporate policy and direction.
At his urging, TI began to look to the board for an objective
assessment of the changing opportunities presented by TI's rapid
growth and complexity. The evolution of its board structure has
continued slowly and deliberately since 1966. Various statements
of policy and guidance memoranda formally adopted by the board
express the principles developed with regard to the composition of
the board and the responsibilities and time requirements of its
members.
One stated objective of the company is that a majority of the
board, excluding the chairman and the president, be individuals
whose primary experience has been other than at TI. Ordinarily,
only those board members who serve as chairman, vice chairman,
president, or officer of the board are employees of the company. At
present, two of our thirteen directors, the President and the Chair-
man, are TI employees, and four others have been employed with
the company in the past.
Eleven of our board members are currently designated as gen-
eral directors and as such are required to assume board duties with
a minimum time commitment of approximately thirty days per
year. These board duties include membership in or chairmanship
of committees as well as optional additional activities in TI's direct
interest. Actual annual time commitments for general directors
range from thirty to seventy-five days, and corresponding fees, ex-
clusive of expenses, range from $46,500 to $90,375.
Directors, as contrasted with general directors, are expected to
spend fifteen days per year on TI business, including scheduled
board meetings. The director's fee corresponding to the minimum
fifteen-day commitment is $23,250. Ordinarily, there will be no
26. P.E. Haggerty, Memorandum to Members of Board of Directors of Texas Instru-
ments 4 (Dec. 15, 1966) (available at the University of Miami Law Review Office).
19831
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
more than two or three persons serving in this capacity, and at
present there are none.
The activities of the TI board members include attendance at
monthly and special board meetings, attendance at corporate plan-
ning meetings, and occasional visits to TI plant and office loca-
tions. For example, during 1982 TI's directors were invited to con-
duct two separate two-week-long tours of all TI operations in
Europe, Japan, and the Pacific Basin. To ensure the desired rela-
tionship between the board and operating organizations, TI ex-
pects most board members to attend some of the scheduled operat-
ing organization meetings, internally known as Quarterly
Management Reviews, at which the activities and performance of
the various product groups are summarized by management.
In the spring of each year, TI board members attend a strate-
gic planning conference to discuss business opportunities for the
next ten years. Managers present their assessments of long-range
opportunities and goals and reassess their strategies for the realiza-
tion of such goals. In an environment that allows for considerable
give and take, board members evaluate management's allocation of
the company's resources and the potential for profitable growth.
After the conference, the board assesses these projections, in light
of corporate objectives, so that necessary actions can be defined.
In addition, TI directors are encouraged to contact manage-
ment outside normal board or committee meetings to discuss infor-
mally specific items of interest to them, such as product develop-
ment, marketing, or financial matters. Obviously, carried to
extremes, this might have a disrupting effect on the management.
But we have found that it is possible to strike an appropriate bal-
ance on both sides, resulting in a very useful and constructive
interchange.
In order to familiarize themselves with TI's operations, general
directors often serve as directors of one or more of TI's subsidiary
corporations. Such service not only reflects the TI board's interest
in the affairs of its subsidiaries; it also demonstrates the board's
concern for how the subsidiary corporations' activities may be
viewed by various groups and institutions, including foreign gov-
ernments, to which those subsidiaries are exposed. Serving on one
or more board committees can be one of the most vital parts of a
director's activities, because certain subjects can be pursued in
greater depth. In particular, committee members can explore those
areas that would be too time-consuming if pursued by the board of
directors as a whole.
[Vol. 37:273
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At TI, the committees of the board are expected to hold three
to seven meetings of varying duration each year. Each general di-
rector is currently expected to devote approximately ten to eigh-
teen days each year to committee work. Currently, we have five
committees of the board: Audit, Board Organization and Nominat-
ing, Finance, Compensation, and Stockholder Relations. The re-
view of long-range policy and planning at TI was formerly the
province of the Corporate Objectives Committee, but it was re-
cently decided that these matters should be considered by the full
board.
According to TI written board policies, a primary criterion in
the selection of candidates for general director, director, or officer
of the board at TI is the ability to bring to the board a dispassion-
ate point of view. In an effort to ensure that those board members
with prior TI experience are able to develop and maintain the de-
sired degree of independence, TI board policy provides that the
selection of a former TI employee as a board member anticipates
that he will enter into activities outside TI that will supplement
his TI experience in a meaningful way.
These policies, and others designed to enhance the knowledge
of TI's outside directors and the independence of its inside direc-
tors, are the product of TI's independent resolve. TI has resolved
to establish a corporate board with a composition designed to guar-
antee that its primary function, ensuring that the affairs of the cor-
poration are conducted in the best interest of the stockholders, is
fulfilled within the context of the corporation's societal
responsibilities.
I do not suggest that this is the ideal solution. TI's board prac-
tices may be inappropriate in other companies. But these practices
have added precision to the distinction between the board and op-
erating management and have fostered a deeper appreciation of
the objective and independent viewpoints of board members. At
the same time, these practices have effected a more fruitful in-
terchange between board and management. TI's board spends a
considerable amount of time on the job, and the fee schedule re-
flects this fact. But the key factor in its evolution has been TI's
commitment to the proposition that the board ought to play an
important role in the company.
The evolutionary process at TI has occurred without legisla-
tive or peer pressure. And the fact that a fundamental restructur-
ing of the board began years before this debate became fashionable
illustrates the responsiveness of the private sector to the perceived
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benefits of a vital, independent board of directors.
IV. THE DRAFT RESTATEMENT: STRAITJACKETING THE BOARD
Although in many respects the recommendations of the Re-
statement Reporters for the structuring of an effective board have
been anticipated by the evolution of the Texas Instruments board,
it is important to recognize that the Draft Restatement differs
from the TI model. The differences that exist reflect the impact of
TI's internal culture and unique organizational needs upon its de-
cision to implement one or another of the currently available orga-
nizational options.
A. Section 1.24 and the Independent Director
The divergent definitions of "independence" provide a useful
example of the differences between the Restatement and the TI
model. As I have mentioned, it has long been a policy of TI's board
that each and every director be able to approach the task of gov-
erning the corporation with a dispassionate and independent point
of view. The Restatement's definition of "significant relationship"
is of critical importance to the project. Section 1.24 provides that a
director has a "significant relationship" with the senior executive,
and thus is not independent, if he is employed by the corporation
or was so employed within the preceeding two years, if he is a close
relative of such a person, or if he has potentially significant contact
with the corporation through his ownership interests or employ-
ment by companies that have done any substantial business with
the corporation.2 7 Those board members who have such a relation-
ship to the corporation are relegated to a less significant role on
the board. They must constitute the minority of the board of large
companies.2 They cannot serve on the audit committee, 29 and they
cannot dismiss derivative actions against corporate fiduciaries.2 0
Unlike the ALI proposals, TI board policy does not automati-
27. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 1.24.
28. See id. § 3.03(a):
Corporate law should provide that at least a majority of the directors of a
large publicly held corporation ... shall be free of any significant relationship
... with the corporation's senior executives,. . . unless a majority of the corpo-
ration's voting securities ... are owned by a single person ... or a family group
Id. (citations omitted); see also id. § 3.03(b) (inside director limitations for smaller publicly
held corporations).
29. Id. § 3.05(a)(1).
30. Id. § 7.03a(ii), b(i), c(i), e.
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cally relegate persons such as recently retired officers or employees
to a subordinate role on the board. Instead, TI seeks to assess each
individual's capacity for independent judgment. This policy is akin
to that adopted by the New York Stock Exchange, which leaves it
to the board to determine the independence of a proposed new di-
rector and the significance of his contacts with the corporation he
must direct.3 1 Not only does this approach have the inherent bene-
fit of increased flexibility; more importantly, it allows those candi-
dates who may be able to bring valuable experience to the board
an opportunity to share that experience without reference to some
preset formula for membership. Although independent judgment is
indeed an important quality, the mechanistic application of a rig-
idly defined concept of independence may actually impair the
functioning of the board by excluding, at least from positions of
responsibility, board members with valuable first-hand manage-
ment knowledge of the corporation. As one commentator has
noted:
When one eliminates from consideration all interested peo-
ple, one must then consider who is left. Disinterested directors,
by definition have little or no personal contact with or knowl-
edge of the company, have little reason to be knowledgeable
about the industry in which the company operates, and do not
have a substantial economic interest in the success of the
company.
It is very difficult to know very much about a company with
which one has no business relationship. If the hypothesis of dis-
interest excludes all past or present employees of the company,
its competitors, customers and suppliers, almost everyone who
knows much about the corporation's business must be
excluded.
32
This may overstate the case, and the point here is not that
independence is a concept without merit, but that there is danger
in a too narrow application of that concept. This objection applies
equally well to other elements of the ALI proposal, perhaps most
particularly to the rigidly cast monitoring role of the board. 3
31. Ruder, supra note 16, at 776 & n.24.
32. Letts, Corporate Governance: A Different Slant, 35 Bus. LAW. 1505, 1514 (1980).
33. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 3.02(a) (board of directors to monitor the corpo-
ration for compliance with corporate plans, policies, standards, and objectives); see also id. §
3.02(a) comment a, at 59-60 (comparison of present law with section's monitoring
provisions).
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B. Section 3.02(a) and the Monitoring Model
Although the monitoring function of the board is universally
recognized, mandating a monitoring structure for all corporations
may have undesirable consequences. The ABA Subcommittee of
the Committee on Corporate Law Departments, charged with re-
viewing the Draft Restatement, noted that once the flexibility of
the board to define its oversight function is removed, the "courts
are free to conclude, after the fact, that the directors do not have
such flexibility and must conform to rigid requirements-nowhere
precisely spelled out-in all cases. '3 4 The emphasis placed on the
duty of the board to monitor management controls much of what
is in the remainder of the Restatement. For example, the composi-
tional requirements of Restatement section 3.0335 are said to "flow
from" the monitoring model embodied in section 3.02.6 The com-
positional requirements and the "independent" nominating com-
mittee, as defined in section 3.06, are intended to provide "a board
that can objectively evaluate the performance of the senior execu-
tives, '3 7 while the audit committee, defined in section 3.05, is in-
tended to furnish "an accurate and reliable flow of information to
the board concerning that performance. 3 8
Although theoretically appealing, this formulation is not only
overly simplistic, but it also fails to recognize the need for flex-
ibility in board function to meet the demands of an everchanging
business environment. The Business Roundtable has noted:
Some successful companies have been headed by a strong chief
executive officer aided by a competent board filling an advisory
and consultative role. Other boards have been required by cir-
cumstances to take an active role in management of the com-
pany's affairs over time in order to meet the problems of a par-
ticular period in corporate history, going far beyond a
monitoring role.39
The structure of many of today's boards would fall between
the extremes of the monitoring and the managerial models. The
very fact that these boards are free to adjust their operations as
34. American Bar Association, Report of the Subcommittee on the American Law In-
stitute's Proposals on Corporate Governance of the Committee on Corporate Law Depart-
ments, DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY, Dec. 1982, at 1, 4 n.7.
35. See supra note 28.
36. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 3.03 comment c, at 73.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Sigler, The Business Roundtable, DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY, Dec. 1982, at 5, 5.
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circumstances warrant contributes to their effectiveness. It may be
true that the oversight function should be of paramount impor-
tance to most corporate boards most of the time. But by mandat-
ing that function as the central role for all boards at all times and
by building a network of obligations and liabilities around that
role, the Draft Restatement may foreclose the use of more effective
board structures and discourage experimentation with board activ-
ity in areas that are not purely monitoring.40 Directors have a role
to play in the resolution of substantive business questions. Isolat-
ing them from the business operations of the corporation and from
the management responsible for the daily conduct of these opera-
tions through a too strict adherence to a monitoring model would
be a mistake. Former SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr. has
noted that "[u]nless we emphasize the economic functions of direc-
tors, there is the danger that we will overload the system with po-
licing functions to the detriment of the economic functions of the
officers, directors, and others who are involved in the corporate
governance process.
41
In addition to inhibiting the board's involvement in strategic
decisionmaking, the narrow monitoring role mandated by the Draft
Restatement would tend to create a barrier between management
and the board that could lead to antagonism and the increased iso-
lation of the board. This could ultimately lead to ineffective per-
formance of the monitoring function itself.
C. Section 4.01(d) and the Business Judgment Rule
Section 4.01 of the Draft Restatement, which establishes a
duty of care and codifies the business judgment rule, possesses fur-
ther problems. As stated by the Reporters in the commentary to
the duty of care section, "there has been confusion in the cases and
commentaries as to the proper standard for judicial review of a de-
40. In January 1981, Texas Instruments announced the formation of an international
board advisory council to assist the TI board of directors on a wide range of political, eco-
nomic, and social issues. This council spends 15 to 30 days a year advising the board as well
as consulting with TI managers in particular areas of council members' expertise. Council
members sometimes serve as directors of TI subsidiaries, particularly outside the United
States, and are often able to bring a new perspective into both board and managerial discus-
sions of important policy issues. This unique experiment, together with the recent efforts of
many corporations to involve the board in the strategic planning process, provides a ready
example of the kind of innovation that may suffer a "chilling effect" from the enactment of
a rigid, monitoring model.
41. Sommer, Should Corporation Laws Function to Restrain Antisocial and Illegal
Conduct?, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 5, at 255, 259.
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liberative business decision."42The Reporters apparently believe
that by suggesting that "corporate law should provide 4 3 for adop-
tion of the Restatement's version of this standard, this confusion
will disappear. Although the Reporters repeatedly assert that the
formulation of the duty of care and business judgment rule con-
tained in section 4.01 is consistent with present standards in "the
overwhelming majority of states," '44 the uproar emanating from the
business community would suggest that a reasonable person could
perceive a difference between the Restatement language and ex-
isting standards.
Under section 4.01(d), a director or officer is not subject to
liability under the duty of care standard if he "(1) informed him-
self and made reasonable inquiry with respect to the business judg-
ment; (2) acted in good faith and without a disabling conflict of
interest; and (3) had a rational basis for the business judgment.
'45
The scope of this "rational basis" test is the subject of some con-
cern. If it is possible for a director to reasonably inform himself
and act in good faith, but without a rational basis, then it would
appear that the threat of unfair hindsight review of an unsuccess-
ful business decision has been increased. This increased threat, or
even the perception of such an increase, can only have the effect of
stifling innovation and venturesome business activity.
The business judgment doctrine should not be viewed merely
as a tool for shielding directors from potential liability; it is a posi-
tive statement on the part of the courts that in matters of business
those who make the decisions must be assured of their freedom.
An article appearing in The Wall Street Journal of June 21, 1982,
examined the concept of "business intuition" and noted that "in
business, decisions based on shrewd intuition are often superior to
those based on careful analytical reasoning."' "4 The authors ob-
served also that "[iIntuition, of course, can lead to just as many
mistakes as rational logic can. By definition, creative intuition can-
not be the product of a formula."' Although the great majority of
business decisions are not of this "creative intuition" variety, the
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 4.01(a) comment d, at 209.
43. Id. § 4.01.
44. Id. § 4.01 comment a, at 142; id. § 4.01 reporter's note 1, at 164-65. For a detailed
chart setting forth duty of care formulations and their sources for each state, see id. § 4.01
reporter's note 1, at 166-70 (appended chart).
45. Id. § 4.01(d).
46. Feinberg & Levenstein, How Do You Know When to Rely on Your Intuition?, Wall




Restatement's emphasis on an "informed inquiry" and "rational
basis" threatens the freedom of action required for creative
decisionmaking.
The uncertainty generated by this "rational basis" require-
ment and by the Restatement's exclusion of vaguely defined "non-
deliberative""8 decisions from the rule's protection promises to
have a negative impact on today's boards. The predictable re-
sponse of many directors to a perception of increased exposure to
liability would be to shun the risk-taking that is essential to effec-
tive corporate governance and to use valuable time to examine in-
significant corporate actions. Moreover, the task of attracting and
retaining persons who have the requisite talents and dedication to
serve on corporate boards will become even more difficult.
D. Remedies and Derivative Actions
The reliance of the Draft Restatement on structural devices,
restrictive definitions, and threatened liability reveals a dangerous
misunderstanding of the true limitations on the effective function-
ing of the board. Most directors would agree that the biggest single
obstacle to the successful involvement of the board in its many ob-
ligations is the limited time available. By providing for the relaxa-
tion of the procedural barriers to derivative actions, the Draft Re-
statement's sections on remedies would create further demands on
the board's time.4 9 Statutory prescriptions of directorial and com-
mittee functions and mechanical procedures for terminating deriv-
ative lawsuits tend to focus the board's attention on adherence to
the letter of the law rather than on the business at hand. These
requirements will lead to more levels of review, more hollow proce-
dures, and more lawyers. The increased likelihood of director lia-
bility as a result of a stiffened business judgment rule, whether ac-
tual or apparent, can only add to the problem. The concern will be
with "papering the trail" to show that the board addressed corpo-
rate plans and policies. The expense of such a course is loss of the
time and freedom required to assess the workings, the direction,
and even the risks the corporation is taking in the process of build-
ing its future.
48. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 4.01 comment a, at 144-47.
49. "[Although the procedural complexity surrounding the derivative action is the
product of legitimate concern about exposing corporate fiduciaries to excessive risks of lia-
bility, these procedural barriers frequently involve an unnecessary degree of overbreadth
which chills meritorious and non-meritorious actions alike." Id. § 7.02 comment a, at 259;
see also id. § 7.02, at 254 (general procedural requirements for derivative actions).
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E. Misplaced Reform
Given the advances that have already been made in the redefi-
nition of the board, and recognizing the process of experimentation
and change that continues today, those who would impose the kind
of potentially harmful reforms that are contained in the Draft Re-
statement must ask themselves: Are mandated reforms really
desirable?
The value of healthy, productive business to our society re-
quires no elaboration. At some point, the internal efficiency and
flexibility that have made American corporations such successful
institutions can be diluted or burdened to a point at which they
can no longer function effectively. To those who would claim that
the corporation is in need of the kind of rigid rules proposed by
the Restatement Reporters, it must be pointed out that corpora-
tions are already subject to the constraints of the marketplace and
to the demands of consumers and shareholders. As one corporate
commentator has noted:
[W]hen it comes to constraints other than the economics of the
market place, existing regulatory agencies influence corporate
conduct far more than is commonly recognized. The EPA, DOE,
SEC, IRS, FCC, NLRB, EEOC, OSHA, Justice, FTC, Treasury,
Interior, and a host of other governmental agencies constantly
confront the corporate executive. We also respond to consumers,
employees, the media, and politicians, and to many other pres-
sure groups.50
Many of those who propose a mandated reform of corporate
governance appear convinced that the abuses that have occurred in
the past are not aberrations, but are somehow linked to the struc-
tural organization of the board. These reformers focus on perceived
abuses of corporate power, some finding an absence of corporate
social responsibility while others cite a lack of control over corpo-
rate actions resulting from the "race to the bottom"' 5' by state cor-
poration statutes 52 seeking to attract more corporate charters. All
reformers appear to agree that legal restraints must be imposed
upon the corporation, and the Draft Restatement is consistent
50. Farrell, Corporations Are Already Overgoverned, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 5,
at 190-91.
51. Cary, Federal Minimum Standards, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 5, at 321.
52. For an excellent capsule summary of the opposing views of the "pragmatists" and





What the advocates of reform fail to recognize is that it is to
the advantage of everyone-shareholders, directors, managers, em-
ployees, and society at large-to maximize corporate profit. Share-
holders, both individual and institutional, do recognize this fact
and indeed have shown no interest in corporate reform move-
ments, including those reforms that call for a return to some myth-
ical "shareholder democracy." The popularity of a Delaware char-
ter has more to do with economic efficiency than with a desire for
unfettered power. Existing laws work well. And although occa-
sional abuses have occurred, the mandated reform of the structure
of corporate governance, whether by federal chartering or by ALI
recommended reform, threatens to halt the evolution of boards tai-
lored to the real needs of corporations and society. 53 Progress to-
ward that goal requires experimentation, flexibility, and freedom.
Reginald Jones, the former chairman of General Electric, has said:
All the emphasis, in the discussion of corporate governance, is'
on the issue of constraints. This, I think, is characteristic of too
much of the public debate today: We are more interested in re-
stricting, constraining, watchdogging, than we are in enabling,
encouraging, liberating, inspiring our people and our institutions
to creative achievement."4
V. CONCLUSION
The last decade has seen the corporate board's rapid develop-
ment toward a greatly enhanced role: the increased use of commit-
tees, a new involvement in strategic planning, a renewed pursuit of
effective monitoring, and generally more time spent by directors on
the job of directing. The statistical surveys indicate all of these
trends. This evidence, together with the movement toward in-
creased remuneration to reflect the broader role of the board, is an
important sign of progress in the area of corporate governance.
The Draft Restatement now threatens this progress.
The progress that has already occurred in the redefinition of
the board deserves a chance to continue to evolve through experi-
53. An interesting analysis of the flawed arguments used by many would-be reformers
is found in Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259 (1982).
Fischel contends that reformers perceive structural problems that do not in fact exist, con-
cluding, "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the corporate governance movement,
despite its durability and widely held support, is much ado about nothing." Id. at 1292.
54. Lorie, An Economist's Perception I: A View on the Need to Revise Corporation
Statutes, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 5, at 60 (quoting Reginald Jones).
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mentation in an atmosphere of freedom. A recent Business Round-
table commentary on the Draft Restatement concluded that the
Restatement proposes significant changes in current law and ob-
jected to the presentation of such a proposal in restatement form.5
The Roundtable concluded also that the structural changes pro-
posed in the Draft Restatement would not achieve the objectives
sought by the Reporters, but instead would "adversely impact
upon the governance and performance of United States corpora-
tions."' The Roundtable Statement "urges that the ALI not pro-





On this there must be agreement. Those who call for reform
have failed to demonstrate a corporate governance problem of a
magnitude that would justify the mandated reforms proposed in
the Draft Restatement. They have failed to consider the potential
negative impact of such reforms on the performance of existing
corporate governance structures. Finally, they have failed to recog-
nize that experimentation, adaptation, flexibility, and freedom are
critical to the continued evolution of effective techniques for gov-
erning the corporation.
55. THE BusiNEss ROUNDTARLE, STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE
AMER cAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUC-
TURK: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" (1983). An encouraging indication that the
concerns that have been expressed by many who have examined the Restatement are not
being ignored is the news that the new part of the Restatement dealing with the duty of
loyalty was not submitted to the membership of the ALI in May of 1983, as was originally
planned, and nothing on the project is scheduled to go to the membership before the 1984
annual meeting.
56. Id. at 67.
57. Id.
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